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Abstract
Background: Cruise ships carry a large number of people in confined spaces with relative homogeneous mixing.
On 3 February, 2020, an outbreak of COVID-19 on cruise ship Diamond Princess was reported with 10 initial cases,
following an index case on board around 21-25th January. By 4th February, public health measures such as removal
and isolation of ill passengers and quarantine of non-ill passengers were implemented. By 20th February, 619 of
3700 passengers and crew (17%) were tested positive.
Methods: We estimated the basic reproduction number from the initial period of the outbreak using SEIR models.
We calibrated the models with transient functions of countermeasures to incidence data. We additionally estimated
a counterfactual scenario in absence of countermeasures, and established a model stratified by crew and guests to
study the impact of differential contact rates among the groups. We also compared scenarios of an earlier versus
later evacuation of the ship.
Results: The basic reproduction rate was initially 4 times higher on-board compared to the R0 in the epicentre in
Wuhan, but the countermeasures lowered it substantially. Based on the modeled initial R0 of 14.8, we estimated
that without any interventions within the time period of 21 January to 19 February, 2920 out of the 3700 (79%)
would have been infected. Isolation and quarantine therefore prevented 2307 cases, and lowered the R0 to 1.78.
We showed that an early evacuation of all passengers on 3 February would have been associated with 76 infected
persons in their incubation time.
Conclusions: The cruise ship conditions clearly amplified an already highly transmissible disease. The public
health measures prevented more than 2000 additional cases compared to no interventions. However, evacuating
all passengers and crew early on in the outbreak would have prevented many more passengers and crew from
infection.
Key words: Coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2, Basic reproduction number, Isolation and quarantine, Incubation time, Evacuation
Introduction
Cruise ships carry a large number of people in confined spaces
with relative homogeneous mixing over a period of time that is
longer than for any other mode of transportation.1 Thus, cruise
ships present a unique environment for transmission of human-
to-human transmitted infections. The association of acute res-
piratory infections (ARI) incidence in passengers is statistically
significant with season, destination and duration of travel.2 In
February 2012, an outbreak of respiratory illness occurred on
the cruise ship off Brazil, resulting in 16 hospitalizations due to
severe ARI and one death.3 In May 2009, a dual outbreak of
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and influenza A (H3N2) on a cruise
ship occurred: of 1970 passengers and 734 crew members, 82
(3.0%) were infected with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus, and 98
2 Journal of Travel Medicine, 2020, Vol. 27, 3
(3.6%) with influenza A (H3N2) virus.4 Four subsequent cases
were epidemiologically linked to passengers but no evidence of
sustained transmission to the community or passengers on the
next cruise was reported.4 In September 2000 an outbreak of
influenza-like illness was reported on a cruise ship sailing off
the Australian coast with over 1100 passengers and 400 crew
on board, coinciding with the peak influenza period in Sydney.5
The cruise morbidity was high with 40 passengers hospitalized,
two of whom died. A total of 310 passengers (37%) reported
suffering from an influenza-like illness.
In December 2019, a novel coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2,
emerged in Wuhan, China and rapidly spread within China
and then to various global cities with high interconnectivity with
China.6 ,7 The resulting ARI due to this coronavirus, a disease
now coined COVID-19, is thought to be mainly transmitted
by respiratory droplets from infected people. The mean serial
interval of COVID-19 is 7.5 days (95% CI, 5.3 to 19) and
the initial estimate for the basic reproductive number R0 was
2.2 (95% CI, 1.4 to 3.9),8 although higher R0 have since
been reported with a mean of more than 3.9 On 18 February
2020, China’s CDC published their data of the first 72 314
cases including 44 672 confirmed cases.10 About 80% of the
confirmed cases were reported to be mild disease or less severe
forms of pneumonia, 13.8% severe and 4.7% critically ill.
Risk factors for severe disease outcomes are older age and
co-morbidities. The progression to acute respiratory distress
syndrome occurs approximately 8-12 days after onset of first
symptoms, with lung abnormalities on chest CT showing
greatest severity approximately 10 days after initial onset
of symptoms.11–13 ,14 Evidence is mounting that also mildly
symptomatic or even asymptomatic cases can transmit the
disease.15 ,16
On 3rd February, 2020, an outbreak of COVID-19 was
reported on Cruise Ship Princess Diamond off the Japanese coast,
with initially 10 persons confirmed to be infected with the virus.
The number has since ballooned into the largest coronavirus
outbreak outside of mainland China. By 19th February, 619
of 3700 passengers and crew (17%) were tested positive. By
end February, six persons had died. The outbreak was traced
to a Hong Kong passenger who embarked on January 21st and
disembarked on January 25th. After docking near New Taipei
City, on January 31, the ship arrived in Yokohoma, Japan. By
the following day, the Japanese health ministry ordered a 14-
day quarantine for everyone on board and rushed to close its
ports to all other cruise ships. The public health measures taken
according to news reports and themedia were removal of all PCR
positive passengers and crew from the ship and their isolation in
Japanese hospitals. The remaining test-negative passengers and
crew remained on board. Passengers were quarantined in their
cruise ship cabins, and only allowed out of the cabin for one
hour per day. By 20th February, the decision to evacuate was
made and more than 3000 passengers left the ship. Most were
air-evacuated by their respective countries.10
The cruise ship with a COVID-19 index case onboard
between the 21-25th January serves as a good model to study its
potential to spread in a population that is more homogenously
mixed, compared to the more spatially variable situation in
Wuhan.
We set out to study the empirical data of COVID-19 con-
firmed infections on the Cruise ship Diamond Princess, to esti-
mate the basic reproduction number (R0) under cruise ship
conditions, the response effectiveness of the quarantine and
removal interventions, and compare scenarios of an earlier and
later evacuation of the ship.
Methods
We used data on confirmed cases on the cruise ship as published
on a daily basis by public sources17 ,18 to calibrate a model
and estimate the basic reproduction number R0 from the time
sequence and amplitude of the case rates observed. COVID-19
is thought to have been introduced by an index case from Hong
Kong visiting the ship between the 21st to 25th of January, 2020.
We thus used the date of 21st January 2020 as the first time point,
t = 0, assuming the index case was infectious from the first day
on the ship. The estimates of R0 and the associated Covid-19
incidence on the cruise ship was derived using a compartmental
model estimating the dynamics of the number of susceptible
(S), exposed (E), infected (I), and recovered (R) individuals,
adapted but modified from a published COVID-19 study.19 We
analyzed two instances of the model assuming respectively: (1)
a homogenous population (3700 individuals), and (2) a strat-
ified population of crew (1000 individuals) and guests (2700
individuals). The model used a relationship between the daily
reproductive number,β, and R0 to infer the transmissibility and
contact rate across the whole cruise ship population by the
relationship:
β = transmissibility ∗ contact rate = R0/i
where the infectious period equals to one over the recovery rate
(γ ), i = 1/γ .
In the homogeneous model, the infectious period, i, of
COVID-19 was set to be 10 days based on previous findings.8
In the situation of no removal (ill persons taken off the ship
to be isolated in a Japanese hospital), the incubation period
(or, the latent period), l was estimated to be approximately
5 days (ranging from 2 to 14 days).20 In order to model the
removal/isolation and quarantine interventions, we implemented
time dependent removal and contact rates as described in
Table 1. We performed additional sensitivity analysis reducing
the R0 to 3.7, an estimate of the average value across mainland
China studies of COVID-19.9
We further estimated a counterfactual scenario of the infec-
tions dynamics assuming no interventions were implemented, in
particular no removal and subsequent isolation of ill persons.
We assumed an infectious period of 10 days, with a contact
rate remaining the same as in the initial phase of the outbreak.
Additionally, in the stratified model of crew and guests, the
contact rate was assumed to be different due to the assumption
that crew could not be easily quarantined as they had to continue
their services on board for all the passengers and possibly had
more homogeneous mixing with all the passengers, whereas
passengers may be mixing more within their preferred circles and
areas. We kept the transient change in the contact rate and the
removal of all PCR confirmed patients starting from the 2nd and
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Table 1. Model parameter description and values. Start time (t = 0) the 20th of January.
Parameters Explanation (unit) Estimated to
β Overall transmissibility and contact rate (1/day) 1.48 if t < 14
0.44 if t ≥ 14
l Incubation period (days) 5 days
i Infectious period or time to removal (days) 10 if t < 16
4 if t ≥ 16
N Total number of people onboard (persons) 3700
βc Transmissibility and contact rate crew (1/day) 1.15 if t < 14
0.35 if t ≥ 14
βgg Transmissibility and contact rate guests to guests (1/day) 1.15 if t < 14
0.35 if t ≥ 14
βgc Transmissibility and contact rate guests to crew (1/day) 0.17 if t < 14
0.05 if t ≥ 14
N g Total number of guests onboard (persons) 2700
N c Total number of crew onboard (persons) 1000
the 5th of February respectively as in the first model. Parameters
are described in Table 1.
The model describing a homogeneous population onboard
can be described by:
dS
dt
= −βI S
N
dE
dt
= βI S
N
− E/l
dI
dt
= E/l − γ I
dR
dt
= γ I
where S denote all susceptible people on the cruise ship, E all
exposed, I all infected andR all recovered or removed, and where
N = S+ E+ I + R denotes the whole population.
The model describing a stratified population onboard can be
described by:
dSg
dt
= −βggIg SgNg − βcIc
Sg
Ng
dEg
dt
= βggIg SgNg + βcIc
Sg
Ng
− Eg/l
dIg
dt
= Eg/l − γ Ig
dRg
dt
= γ Ig
dSc
dt
= −βcIc ScNc − βgcIg
Sc
Nc
dEc
dt
= βcIc ScNc + βgcIg
Sc
Nc
− Ec/l
dI
dt
= Ec/l − γ Ic
dR
dt
= γ Ic
where S denotes susceptible, E exposed, I infected and R recov-
ered or removed, N = S + E + I + R, and the subscript g and
c are indicating guest and crew respectively. Overall, we assume
mortality is negligible.
Models with interventions were calibrated to reports of total
infection occurrence, while models simulating the counterfac-
tual scenarios where left with the naïve parameter settings (no
countermeasures). The net effects of the countermeasures where
estimated as the difference between the counterfactual scenario
and the model with the interventions. Model parameters are
described in Table 1. The effectiveness of the countermeasures
was estimated by calibration of the model to data.
We here also present estimations of the plausible conse-
quences of a hypothetical third intervention strategy, whereby
all individuals onboard would have been evacuated either on 3rd
of February or 19th of February.We estimated and presented the
number of latent cases on 3rd February evacuation and on 19th
February, 2020.
Results
Using the SEIR model assuming relatively homogenous mixing
of all people onboard, we calibrated the predicted cumulative
number of infections from the model to the observed cumulative
number of infections among all people onboard and estimated
the initial R0 to be 14.8. This translates into an estimate of β
(the daily reproduction rate) to 1.48. To derive this estimate we
calibrated functions describing transient change in the β as a
result of changes in contact rate and the removal of symptomatic
infections. The parameter values of contact rate, quarantine
interventions and removal presented in Table 1 are the results of
the calibration to the observed cumulative incidence data. The
contact rate between persons on the cruise ship was calibrated
to give the best fit to data with a reduction of 70% by the
quarantine countermeasure with onset 3rd February, 2020. The
transient function of removal and isolation of infected cases with
an onset on 5th February, 2020, reduced the infectious period
from 10 to 4 days, and substantially reduced the transmission
and sub-sequent infections on the ship. In Figure 1 we present
the change inR0 based on the relationship betweenR0 and β and
how it is affected by the transient countermeasures of quarantine
and removal of ill patients from the model. Here R0 should
be interpreted as the basic reproductive rate in a totally naïve
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Figure 1. The estimated basic reproduction number, R0, on the cruise ship and its change over time as a result of the transient interventions of
quarantine and removal of infectious cases. The R0 given here assumes one index case in a totally naïve population, although that is not the case
on the ship, we use it here to illustrate how the R0 is sensitive to the interventions, but still substantially large to fuel a continuation of the epidemic.
The grey line indicates R0 = 1.
population on the Diamond Princess (i.e. same contact rate),
and not the actual basic reproductive number over time on the
cruise ship. The R0 was 14.8 initially and then Rt declined to a
stable 1.78 after the quarantine and removal interventions were
initiated (Figure 1).
The predicted cumulative number of cases over time from this
model described the observed cases well, but overestimated the
cumulative case incidence rate initially (Figure 2). This allowed
to compensate for reporting bias in the initial phase, given that
the proportion of testing of all passengers was patchy while at the
end of the study (19th February, 2020) the testing of passengers
had a higher coverage and was more complete. The modelled
cumulative number of cases on 19 February, 2020, is 613 out of
the 3700 people at risk, while the observed reported number of
cases is 619. The counterfactual scenario assuming homogenous
rates among crew and guests without any interventions (no
removal off the ship or isolation of ill persons nor any quarantine
measures for the remaining passengers on boat), estimated the
number of cumulative cases to be 2920 out of the 3700 after
30 days, that is by 19th of February (Figure 2). The net effect
of the combined interventions was estimated to prevent a total
number of 2307 cases by 19th February, 2020 (Figure 2).
In a sensitivity analysis we modified the R0 to 3.7 (and
consequently β to 0.37) as this has been reported the average
basic reproduction number from studies of COVID-19 in China.9
However, from our simulation, even in the absence of any
intervention, such a low R0 cannot explain the rapid growth
of incident cases on the cruise ship (Figure 3). This sensitivity
scenario excluded countermeasures from the model making it
unrealistic that such a low R0 value could be the true value in the
cruise ship situation with confined spaces and high homogeneous
mixing of the same persons. The estimate with the lowerR0 value
also omitted to consider the strong interventions put into place,
making it even more unrealistic.
We additionally modeled a scenario stratified by crew and
guests whereby we assumed the parameter values of transmission
risk to be lower for crew to guest than for guest to crew (Table 1).
The predicted cumulative number of infected crew and guests by
19th of February from this model was 168 out of 1000 (16.8%)
and 464 out of 2700 (17.2%), respectively (Figure 4). The total
number of cumulative cases by 19th of February predicted from
this model was 632, close to the observed number of cases of 619.
The predicted cumulative incidence rates were overestimated for
crew while underestimated for guests based on available tests
results at the time of writing (Figure 4). These data still need to
be validated against the empiric data of test results in all crew
and passengers which should soon become available.
Instead of keeping all passengers on board, another option
would have been to evacuate all individuals onboard the cruise
ship earlier, and allow them to go home for a potential quarantine
in their respective home countries. We modeled that an evacua-
tion by 3rd February, 2020, would have resulted in 76 latent cases
(cases during the incubation time), while an evacuation by 19th
February would have resulted in 246 latent cases.
Discussion
Modelling the COVID-19 on-board outbreak reveals important
insights into the epidemic risk and effectiveness of public health
measures. We found that the reproductive number of COVID-19
in the cruise ship situation of 3700 persons confined to a limited
space was around 4 times higher than in the epicenter in Wuhan,
where R0 was estimated to have a mean of 3.7.9 Interestingly, a
rough estimation of the population per square km on this 18-
deck ship is 286 by 62 meters (0.32 km2). Assuming that only
50% of decks are being used, approximately 24 400 persons are
confined per km2 on a ship compared to approximately 6000
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Figure 2. Predicted total number of infections using model 1 (no stratification) for the realistic situation with interventions (blue), counterfactual
scenario without intervention (grey) and the net effect of the interventions (black).
Figure 3. Sensitivity analysis: predicting total number of infections using a model without interventions with R0 set to 3.7 with index case 21th
January (bottom). Observed reports of cumulative cases are marked as ‘o’.
persons per km2 (9 000 000/1528) in urban Wuhan. This means
that the population density was about 4 times higher on the
cruise ship. Thus, both R0 and contact rate are dependent on
population density, as also suggested by previous research.21 In
population-based models on observational data the population
per square km is often substantially different, affecting the
R0 and β coefficient implicitly by changes in the contact rate
expressed as:
R0
i
= Transmissibility ∗ contact rate
The local estimate of R0 can be divided into a localized
contact rate and a multiplier that is necessary for moving from
one population to another:
contact rate = contact ratelocalized ∗ pd, where pd is the
population density multiplier. In our case it was approximated to
4. Here the contact rate is related to a contact rate in a defined
population in a certain area and the population density multiplier
modifies the contact rate when moving across different local
populations and geographical areas representing heterogeneity
in population density. In the case of the cruise ship, the potential
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Figure 4.Predicted total number of infections using amodel stratified into crew and guest for the realistic situationwith interventions. Total population
onboard (black), guests (grey), crew (blue). Observed total case numbers of total (black), crew (blue) and guest (grey) are marked as ‘o’.
relationship of R0 to population density thus appears to be
mainly attributed by the contact rate and mixing effects. This
information is also important for other settings characterized by
high population densities.
With such a high R0, we estimated that without any inter-
ventions within the time period of 21st January to 19th February
2920 out of the 3700 (79%) would have been infected, assuming
relatively homogenous mixing between all people on board.
The quarantine and removal interventions launched when
the outbreak was confirmed (3rd February and 5th of February)
substantially lowered the contact rate and reduced the cumula-
tive case burden by an estimated 2307 cases by 19th February.
We note, however, that the longer time span of simulation
beyond 19th February, assuming people would stay on the boat,
would reduce the net effect of the intervention substantially. We
further note that an earlier evacuation would have corresponded
to disembarking a substantially lower number of latent unde-
tectable infections (76 vs. 246), likely giving rise to some further
transmission outside the ship.
We also found that contact rate of guest to guest and crew
appeared higher than the contact rate from guest to crew, perhaps
driven by high transmission rates within cabins.However, testing
of crew was delayed, and there was a testing bias towards testing
more passengers than crew. Hence our analysis needs to be
revisited when all data is available.
The limitations of our study include our lack of data on
the lag time between onset of symptoms, the timing of testing
and potential delay to the availability of test results. Due to the
large number of people, not everyone was tested, and we suspect
that the timing of the test results do not totally tally with real-
time onset of cases. We had no access to data on incident cases
in crew versus passengers, nor any data on whether there was
clustering of cases around certain nationalities or crew members.
Furthermore, although theHongKong passenger was assumed to
be the index case, it could well have been possible that there was
more than one index case on board who could have contributed
to transmission, and this would have lowered our estimated R0.
Lastly, our models are based on human-to-human transmission
and do not take into account the possibility that fomites, or water
systems with infected feces, contributed to the outbreak.
The interventions that included the removal of all persons
with confirmed COVID-19 disease combined with the quar-
antine of all passengers substantially reduced the anticipated
number of new COVID-19 cases compared to a scenario without
any interventions (17% attack rate with intervention versus 79%
without intervention) and thus prevented a total number of 2307
additional cases by 19th February.However, the main conclusion
from our modelling is that evacuating all passengers and crew
early on in the outbreak would have prevented many more
passengers and crew members from getting infected. A scenario
of early evacuation at the time of first detection of the outbreak (3
February) would have resulted in only 76 latent infected persons
during the incubation time (with potentially still negative tests).
A late evacuation by 19th February would have resulted in about
246 infected persons during their incubation time. These data
need to be confirmed by empiric data of testing all evacuated
persons after 19th February, and may be an overestimate as we
assumed a stable R0 after quarantine was instituted. However,
the R0 probably declined over time, as the implementation of
quarantine measures were incrementally implemented leading to
better quarantine standards towards the end of the quarantine
period.
In conclusion, the cruise ship conditions clearly amplified an
already highly transmissible disease. R0 is related to population
density, and is particularly driven by contact rate and mixing
effects, and this explains the high R0 in the first weeks before
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countermeasures were initiated. Population densities and mixing
need to be taken into account in future modeling of the COVID-
19 outbreak in different settings. Early evacuation of all pas-
sengers on a cruise ship- a situation with confined spaces and
high intermixing- is recommended as soon as an outbreak of
COVID-19 is confirmed.
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